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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

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NSA

18 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE USCIB SPECIAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY COMINT PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS
AND PRACTICES

SUBJECT: Announcement of Initial Meeting

1. The first meeting of the Special Committee established by USCIB to study COMINT personnel security standards and practices will be held at 1000 on ~~8~~⁷ September 1955 in Room 2E859, The Pentagon.
2. Because the study to be undertaken by this Committee was prompted by the so-called Petersen Case, it is considered that a summation of that case might be helpful in clarifying the basic problems to be examined by the Committee. It is therefore requested that the NSA representative be prepared to provide, as the Committee's first order of business, a briefing on the Petersen Case to include conclusions as to what that case demonstrates to be adequate and/or inadequate in present USCIB personnel security policies.
3. It is proposed that the Committee next consider methods of procedure to accomplish the study desired by USCIB which is to include:
 - a. A review of the degree of close supervision, control and inspection maintained by each member agency.
 - b. A review of USCIB policy and the provisions of USCIB Directive No. 5.
 - c. A study of the feasibility of establishing different levels of clearance for access to the different categories of COMINT.
4. It is suggested that an efficient method of procedure would be for each member to submit to the Committee a report on the procedures and practices employed by his department or agency in implementing USCIB Directive No. 5 to include at least a summary of:
 - a. Pre-access checking and background investigating procedures and practices.
 - b. Methods of supervision, control, security education and inspection of COMINT personnel.

OSD AND NSA REVIEW COMPLETED

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c. Means by which the potential damage a faulty employee could do can be minimized.

d. Conclusions as to the adequacy and/or inadequacy of present USCIB personnel security standards and practices.

e. Recommendations for improving said standards and practices, if deemed inadequate.

5. It is requested that prior to the meeting the members of the Committee provide Mr. Hugh Erskine, OSO, OSD (Code 131, Ext. 74317) with the names of those alternates and observers who will be in attendance from their respective departments and agencies.

SIGNED

Jerome D. Fenton
Director
Office of Industrial Personnel Security Review
Chairman

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